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THE ZONING DIET: USING RESTRICTIVE ZONING
TO SHRINK AMERICAN WAISTLINES
Allyson C. Spacht*
INTRODUGriON
Would you like fries with that? Unfortunately, this phrase has
become all too common to American adults and children alike. Fast
food has become imbedded in American culture. McDonald's golden
arches are more recognizable than the Christian cross.' In a survey of
American children, ninety-six percent were able to identify Ronald
McDonald, who was the second most recognized fictional character
after Santa Claus. 2 Each year, Americans spend more money on fast
food than on higher education, personal computers, or new cars.3
The amount of money that Americans spend on fast food trumps their
combined spending on movies, books, magazines, newspapers, videos,
and recorded music. 4 Americans are taking advantage of the ubiquity
of fast food restaurants in the United States. Nearly one-quarter of
the country's population visits a fast food restaurant on any given day.5
The omnipresence of fast food is receiving much of the blame for
the obesity epidemic in America.6 Experts agree that a strong correla-
tion exists between the abundance of fast food restaurants and obes-
ity.7 This correlation is due, in part, to the availability of large,
inexpensive, energy-dense portions at fast food restaurants, coupled
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.B.A., Marketing,
University of Notre Dame, 2004. I would like to thank Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett
for her guidance and insight throughout this process, as well as the staff of the Notre
Dame Law Review for their diligence and hard work. I would like to extend a heartfelt
thank you to my parents, Glenn and Carole Ann Spacht, for their endless support and
encouragement.
1 ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 4 (2001).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 242.
7 See id.
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with the high frequency with which Americans consume fast food.8
Many states are responding to this epidemic by employing a variety of
tools to foster public health, including "snack taxes," public education
campaigns, and bans on trans fats.9 Additionally, many communities
are using zoning regulations to restrict or exclude fast food restau-
rants. These types of zoning ordinances have traditionally been
enacted under the guise of community aesthetic concerns, but, within
the past several years, local governments have begun to consider
employing land use restrictions for the express purpose of promoting
public health.
In July 2008, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously approved
an Interim Control Ordinance (ICO) "designed to address the imbal-
ance in food options currently available in South Los Angeles."10 The
ordinance proposes a one-year moratorium on new fast food restau-
rants in the South Los Angeles, Southeast Los Angeles, West Adams,
Baldwin Hills, and Leimert Park community planning areas." The
ordinance defines a fast food restaurant as " [a] ny establishment which
dispenses food for consumption on or off the premises, and which has
the following characteristics: a limited menu, items prepared in
advance or prepared or heated quickly, no table orders, and food
served in disposable wrapping or containers."' 2 The ICO was drafted
and passed in order to
provide a strong and competitive commercial sector which best
serves the needs of the community, attract uses which strengthen
the economic base and expand market opportunities for existing
and new businesses, enhance the appearance of commercial dis-
tricts, and identify and address the over-concentration of uses which
are detrimental to the health and welfare of the people of the
community.1s
8 JULIE SAMIA MAIR ET AL., CTRS. FOR LAW & THE PuBLIc's HEALTH, THE USE OF
ZONING To RESTRIcT FAST FOOD OUTLETS 10 (2005), http://publichealthlaw.net/Zon-
ing%20Fast%20Food%200utlets.pdf.
9 See infra Part I.B.
10 Press Release, Councilwoman Jan C. Perry, South Los Angeles Fast Food
Interim Control Ordinance Unanimously Approved by Los Angeles City Council (July
29, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Perry Press Release]. The ICO was
drafted in response to a motion by Councilwoman Jan C. Perry, whose Ninth District
includes much of South Los Angeles. Id. The motion was seconded by Councilman
Bernard Parks, whose entire Eighth District is within the affected area. Id.
11 Id.




The over-concentration of fast food restaurants in the South Los
Angeles region motivated the drafting and passage of the ordinance.14
The goal of the ICO is to allow city planners to analyze the quan-
tity of fast food restaurants in these communities and to develop solu-
tions to combat the extreme imbalance that has resulted in these
areas from decades of spot zoning and neglect in community plan-
ning and development.' 5 With minimal land remaining for develop-
ment in these areas, the ICO allows city planners to determine what
types of businesses best suit a community with the highest incidence
of diabetes in the county and an obesity rate that is nine percent
above the county average.' 6 The ICO enables council members to
actively attract healthier options to these communities, including gro-
cery stores and sit-down restaurants, by preserving the limited existing
land for such uses.17 Councilwoman Jan C. Perry, author of the ICO,
and fellow supporters of the ordinance argue that "[m]aking healthy
decisions about food is difficult when people have small incomes, the
grocery store is five miles away and a $1 cheeseburger is right around
the corner."18 The ICO serves as just one of the many planning tools
the Los Angeles City Council hopes to employ "'to attract sit-down
restaurants, full service grocery stores, and healthy food alterna-
tives . . . in an aggressive manner.' 9
A movement to regain American health and well-being has
begun, and the Los Angeles ICO is just one weapon in the country's
expanding arsenal. Battles are being waged around the country, with
schools eliminating soda, cities banning trans fats, and, most recently,
New York City requiring certain food service establishments to display
calorie content on menus and menu boards. 20 The Los Angeles ICO,
14 See id. Recent reports show that forty-five percent of the restaurants in South
Los Angeles are fast food outlets with minimal seating, whereas only sixtcen percent
of the restaurants in the west side of the city are fast food outlets. Id.
15 The ICO is designed as a stop-gap measure to allow City Planning time to study
the effects of these establishments as they pertain to community design, pedestrian
activity, traffic and other important urban planning issues. Perry Press Release, supra
note 10.
16 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Panel OKs Fast-Food Curbs, L.A. TimEs, July 23, 2008, at
B2.
17 A grocery store and sit-down restaurant package is presently being marketed to
developers and retailers to attract these establishments to the area. Perry Press
Release, supra note 10. Incentive packages are being designed to further assist this
effort, including underground power lines, expedited site plan review, and land
assemblage assistance. Id.
18 Kim Severson, Fast Food Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at Fl.
19 Perry Press Release, supra note 10 (quoting Jan C. Perry).
20 Severson, supra note 18.
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however, is truly radical in nature because it appears to be the first
instance of a local government prohibiting a certain type of restaurant
for health, rather than aesthetic, reasons 1 Municipalities often use
different types of zoning regulations as tools to restrict or exclude fast
food restaurants;22 however, they are careful to predicate such ordi-
nances on the protection of the unique and aesthetic character of the
community.23 While other communities have proposed similar types
of regulations, 24 the Los Angeles ICO appears to be the first regula-
tion approved that explicitly defines the "health and welfare of the
people of the community" as one of its purposes.25
Critics have already begun to speak out, many claiming that this
type of regulation is too paternalistic and does not credit the intellect
of the over 500,000 people who live in the South Los Angeles area. 26
They see this type of government control over the "built environment"
as an imposition of government officials' values on the public and
believe that the sale and purchase of food should operate in a free-
market system.27 The National Restaurant Association opposes the
ban, agreeing that the government has an interest in solving the
American obesity epidemic because of its impact on health costs, but
averring that lawmakers have overstepped their bounds.28 It argues
that restaurants are not the sole cause of the obesity epidemic, but
because lawmakers cannot control the food being consumed at home,
or the lack of physical activity in Americans' daily regimens, they have
therefore turned to the only place where they can exert control, caus-
21 Id.
22 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 40.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 52-53.
25 L.A., Cal., Ordinance 180103 (July 29, 2008).
26 See Severson, supra note 18. "'The crime in all of this is that people are sitting
around meddling into the very minutiae of what people are putting into their
mouths' . .. ." Id. (quoting Joe R. Hicks, former Executive Director of Los Angeles's
Human Relations Commission).
27 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Law as a Tool to Facilitate Healthier Lifestyles and Prevent
Obesity, 297 JAMA 87, 89 (2007) (discussing legal interventions to combat the Ameri-
can obesity epidemic). "Built environment" can be defined as structures that form an
individual's living space. See id. But see Wendy C. Perdue et al., Public Health and the
Built Environment: Historical, Empirical, and Theoretical Foundations for an Expanded Role,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 557, 561 (2003) ("Government is already highly involved in the
built environment through direct intervention and regulation. Thus, the political
choice is not whether to plan the built environment, but how to plan it under optimal
conditions that benefit the population. And this choice ought to be influenced by
evidence about the associations between land use and health." (footnote omitted)).
28 Severson, supra note 18.
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ing fast food restaurants to take the fall for Americans' poor personal
choices.29
There are also several types of constitutional challenges that may
potentially be raised in opposition to this kind of legislation, and it is
only a matter of time until the courts are forced to address the consti-
tutional validity of this type of land use regulation. First, restrictive
fast food zoning may violate substantive due process, which requires
that zoning regulations be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest.30 Fast food zoning may also violate the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment,31 which requires the government to pay just
compensation when it imposes an unfair burden on a landowner.3 2
However, because zoning for public health often provides legislatures
with broader discretion to zone than other goals, courts often defer to
legislatures regulating for public health purposes. Furthermore, the
fact that prohibiting certain types of food establishments does not
deprive property owners of all economically viable uses of their land
strongly suggests that fast food zoning would most likely survive such
challenges.33 While the roles of substantive due process and the Tak-
ings Clause have decreased in land use cases, the dormant Commerce
Clause has played an increasing role in challenges to the validity of
restrictive land use planning mechanisms such as restrictive zoning.34
This Note argues that restrictive zoning of fast food restaurants to
combat obesity as a matter of public health is a valid exercise of a
municipality's police power and survives constitutional challenges
raised under the dormant Commerce Clause. Part I of this Note
examines the American obesity epidemic, including the possible
29 See id.
30 See 6 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROlS § 35.04(1) (b) (Eric
Damian Kelly ed., 2009).
31 U.S. CONST. amend 5 ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
32 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAw § 16.2,
at 682 (1998).
33 See MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, app. B at ii-iii.
34 SeeJohn M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, "Drawn from Local Knowledge
... And Conformed to Local Wants": Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2006) ("With the proliferation of measures
by local governments to preserve the local character of their communities in the face
of sprawling retail development, the trickle of land use cases in which the dormant
Commerce Clause plays a significant role seems likely to turn into a flood . . . . As
these cases begin to percolate up through the system, it seems likely that the Supreme
Court will soon be confronted with demands to clarify how its dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine applies in zoning cases." (footnotes omitted)).
2009] 395
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
causes and solutions for this public health emergency. Part II dis-
cusses the origins of zoning in state police power and the delegation
of this power to local governments to regulate for the health and wel-
fare of their communities. Part III examines the dormant Commerce
Clause and the limitations it places on the states' ability to regulate
economic activities. Finally, Part IV argues that local governments
have the ability to restrictively zone fast food restaurants under their
police powers in the interest of the public's health and welfare. This
type of land use control does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause because it is neither facially discriminatory nor unduly burden-
some to interstate commerce, and the benefit it provides to the health
and welfare of the community outweighs its incidental commercial
burden. Therefore, the ICO approved in Los Angeles, as well as a
permanent fast-food-restrictive zoning ordinance, are two constitu-
tionally valid tools that may be placed in the nation's arsenal in its
battle against the American obesity epidemic.
I. THE AMERICAN OBESrry EPIDEMIC
Obesity in America has become such a prevalent and alarming
issue that it can no longer be ignored. This epidemic is attributable in
large part to the ubiquity of fast food in the United States. Many local
governments have begun to wage war against ballooning waistlines in
an attempt to recapture American health. A variety of tactics are
being employed, including public-education campaigns, healthy-living
initiatives, and so-called snack taxes. Recently, local governments
began using land use regulations to restrict or exclude fast food res-
taurants from their communities. While most local governments
restrictively zone fast food restaurants under the stated purpose of
protecting community aesthetics while reaping the health benefits of
their exclusion, municipalities are now exploring the possibility of
restrictively zoning fast food establishments for the express purpose of
combating obesity.
A. Obesity in America
America cannot continue to close its eyes and claim ignorance to
a serious health concern that permeates its city streets, its office build-
ings, and its schools. According to a poll by Trust for America's
Health, eighty-five percent of Americans believe that obesity has
become an epidemic in the United States.35 In 2003-2004, an esti-




mated thirty-two percent of American adults were obese.3 6 Obesity
rates have continued to rise in thirty-one states, with the adult obesity
rate exceeding twenty percent in forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia.3 7 In 2007, two-thirds of American adults were obese or
overweight.3 8 American children are also suffering, with twenty-five
million children already obese or overweight.39
Obesity potentially leads to a variety of increased health risks,
including type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, and hypertension.40
The obesity epidemic continues to increasingly drain American
resources as overweight and obesity lead to a variety of direct and indi-
rect costs for taxpayers every year.41 An estimated $117 billion in
obesity costs were incurred in 2000 alone.42
Surprisingly, few studies have been conducted to determine the
specific factors in our environment that facilitate obesity. 4 3 Most
experts agree that biology alone cannot explain the extreme weight
gain observed over the past few decades. 44 Body weight is affected by
a number of factors, including genetic, metabolic, environmental,
behavioral, cultural, and socioeconomic influences. 45 The consensus
among experts is that environmental factors, specifically excessive cal-
orie consumption and inadequate physical activity, have caused Amer-
ican waistlines to balloon.46
36 Id. at 5.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 9 (defining obesity as "an excessively high amount of body fat or adipose
tissue in relation to lean body mass" and overweight as an "increased body weight in
relation to height, which is then compared to a standard of acceptable weight").
39 Id. at 3.
40 WEIGHT-CONTROL INFO. NETWORK, NAT'L INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KID-
NEY DISEASES, STATISTICS RELATED TO OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 1 (2007), available at
http://win.niddk.nih.gov/publications/PDFs/stat904z.pdf.
41 OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESrrY 9 (2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/
pdf/CalltoAction.pdf ("Direct health care costs refer to preventive, diagnostic, and
treatment services related to overweight and obesity (for example, physician visits and
hospital and nursing home care). Indirect costs refer to the value of wages lost by
people unable to work because of illness or disability, as well as the value of future
earnings lost by premature death.").
42 Id. at 10. Sixty-one billion dollars were spent on direct costs and fifty-six billion
dollars were spent on indirect costs.
43 James 0. Hill et al., Modifying the Environment to Reverse Obesity, in ESSAYS ON THE
FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH 108, 108 (Thomas J. Goehl ed., 2005).
44 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 9.
45 OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, supra note 41, at 1.
46 Id.
2oog] 397
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Much of the blame for the U.S. obesity epidemic has been placed
on the ubiquity of fast food. The per capita number of fast food res-
taurants in the United States doubled between 1972 and 1999,47 and
by 2002 there were approximately 222,000 fast food outlets in the
United States, which generated an estimated $130.1 billion in annual
sales. 4 8 Studies reveal that fast food "may contribute to high intake of
energy, fat, sodium, carbonated soft drinks, and fried potato, and low
intake of milk, fruits, vegetables, dietary fiber, and some vitamins."4 9
There also appears to be a close correlation between the abundance
of American-style fast food restaurants and obesity around the world.5 0
Experts suggest three reasons for the correlation between fast
food and obesity: the availability of large, inexpensive portions; the
high energy density of these foods; and the frequency with which fast
food is consumed by Americans.5 1 Generally, food portion sizes have
continually increased in the United States over the past three
decades.5 2 Thus, Americans are eating more food and, in the case of
fast food, more energy-dense food.55 Furthermore, Americans are
consuming fast food with increasing frequency. In 1970, Americans
only spent twenty-five percent of their total food costs away from
home, a number that increased to nearly half by 1999.54 The percent-
age of meals consumed at fast food restaurants continues to increase
at a faster rate than those consumed at any other type of restaurant.55
47 Richard A. Dunn, Obesity and the Availability of Fast-Food 1 (Mar. 31, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=989363#.
48 Sahasporn Paeratakul et al., Fast-Food Consumption Among US Adults and Chil-
dren: Dietary and Nutrient Intake Profile, 103 J. AM. DIABETIC Ass'N 1332, 1332 (2003); see
also SCHLOSSER, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing that, while fast food originally began as a
handful of hot dog and hamburger stands, it is now served in a variety of American
localities and establishments including restaurants, drive-throughs, stadiums, schools
at all levels of education, trains, superstores, gas stations, and even hospital
cafeterias).
49 Paeratakul et al., supra note 48, at 1334.
50 SCHLOSSER, supra note 1, at 242.
51 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.
52 Id.
53 Energy density is a measure of the amount of energy calories per weight in a
particular food. Id. at 11. Fast foods are more energy dense than other types of food
because they are higher in fat. Id. Foods with higher energy densities would not be
of such great concern if consumers expended the excess energy they consume
through physical activity. "[O]nly 10 extra kilocalories per day of unexpended energy
amounts to an extra pound of weight per year .... " Id. at 12-13.




B. Possible Solutions to the American Obesity Epidemic
Many states have heard the call to action and have begun to take
steps to combat the obesity epidemic in America. The majority of
people support government involvement to address the American
obesity problem.56 State governments have responded in a variety of
ways, including public-education campaigns, healthy-living initiatives
for state government employees, and public-private partnership devel-
opment.57 Some states have enacted snack taxes, taxing junk foods in
an effort to reduce consumption of that food group.58 Local govern-
ments are also taking action to combat American obesity. For exam-
ple, in December 2006, the New York City Board of Health mandated
that those food service establishments that serve food with standard-
ized production and portion sizes and that publicly provide calorie
information must prominently display their food's calorie content on
their menus or menu boards.5 9 The Board of Health also issued a ban
on all but trace amounts of trans fats in city restaurants. 60 There have
also been school-based initiatives to improve the quality of food served
in schools. School breakfast, lunch, and after-school snack programs
are offered as part of a coordinated effort between state school sys-
tems and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food
and Nutrition Service.6 1 The USDA subsidizes states that meet the
national nutrition guidelines and offer "free or reduced cost" meals to
children coming from low-income households.6 2  Seventeen states
56 LEVI ET AL., supra note 35, at 85 ("A majority of adults (51 percent) say that the
primary responsibility for tackling the obesity epidemic should come from a combina-
tion of individuals and government. Eighty-one percent of Americans believe that
government should have some role in addressing the issue.").
57 Id. at 17.
58 Id. at 35.
59 Id. at 20. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld
this law after it was challenged by the New York State Restaurant Association. The
court found that the law was not preempted by the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.), which explicitly left power to state and local governments to
impose mandatory nutrition labeling on restaurants. Press Release, N.Y. City Law
Dep't, Federal Court Upholds New York City Health Code Provision Requiring Cer-
tain Restaurants to Post Calorie Information on Menu and Menu Boards (Apr. 16,
2008), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/pr04168.pdf.
60 LEVI ET AL., supra note 35, at 20.
61 Id. at 29.
62 Id.
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have established stricter nutritional standards than those recom-
mended by the USDA. 6 3
Communities across the country have also employed zoning
restrictions to restrict or exclude fast food restaurants. 64 Some com-
munities have chosen only to ban drive-through service, which has rel-
atively the same effect as a total fast food ban as sixty percent or more
of fast food business stems from drive-through service. 65 The stated
purpose of these zoning regulations is to protect the unique and aes-
thetic character of the community.66 Instead of an outright ban on
fast food restaurants, some cities have banned "formula" restaurants.67
Other cities have established bans that only affect certain areas of the
locality.68 Fast food ubiquity is also being controlled by setting quotas
for the number of restaurants or food service establishments allowed
within a given area.69 Finally, some municipalities have restricted the
expansion of fast food restaurants by establishing limitations on the
density of fast food restaurants, that is, by limiting the number of fast
food restaurants per unit space or through explicit spacing require-
ments.7 0 While most of these municipalities have predicated their
63 Id. Many Americans have become extremely concerned about childhood
obesity and view schools as a starting point to tackle the obesity epidemic. Id. at 85.
64 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 40. These types of zoning restrictions have been
passed for reasons other than the protection of the public from the threat of obesity.
However, some have been enacted for public health purposes. Id.
65 Id. Typically, it would be unprofitable for fast food outlets to open in a locality
where drive-throughs are prohibited, making this type of restrictive zoning a success-
ful deterrent.
66 Id. For example, the city of Concord, Massachusetts established an explicit
ban on all drive-in or fast food restaurants. CONCORD, MAss., ZONING BYLAW § 1.2
(2008), available at http://www.concordma.gov/Pages/ConcordMABOA/zone/
2008ZoningBylawCOMPLETE.pdf. One of the purposes of this ban, as set forth in
the zoning bylaws, is "to preserve and enhance the development of the natural, scenic
and aesthetic qualities of the community." Id. § 4.7.1.
67 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 43 ("The definition [of 'formula' restaurants] can
be drafted and interpreted broadly to include a local restaurant that has only one
other similar restaurant in the area or interpreted narrowly to include only large
national chain restaurants.").
68 Id. at 45. For example, the City and County of San Francisco banned all
"formula retail use[s]," which include fast food outlets, in the four-block Hayes-
Gough Neighborhood Commercial District. S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(e)
(2008), available at http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14139&
sid=5.
69 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 49.
70 Id. at 50. The City of Bainbridge Island, Washington uses a density limitation
to restrict the number fast food outlets.
Any formula take-out food restaurant may not exceed 4000 square feet
and must be in a building that is shared with at least one other business that
[VOL. 85:1400
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zoning on some type of aesthetic ground, the City of Los Angeles
appears to be the first city to pass an interim control ordinance
restricting fast food outlets for the express purpose of combating
American obesity by addressing the over-concentration of fast food
restaurants which, according to the ordinance's purposes, are "detri-
mental to the health and welfare of the people of the community."71
II. THE POLICE POWER AND ZONING
Public land use controls, such as zoning, are exercises of states'
police power. 72 Under the police power, states have the authority to
enact laws to promote the health, safety, morals, and public welfare of
the community.73 The police power predates the Constitution, arising
from the states' sovereignty and their inherent authority over certain
issues.74 Alexander Hamilton wrote, "[t] he State governments by
their original constitutions are invested with complete sovereignty,"
arguing that the states would retain all of their inherent powers that
were not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.7 5
When the states ratified the Constitution, they agreed to give up some
aspects of their sovereignty to the federal government but did not for-
feit all of their authority.76 The Constitution granted the federal gov-
ernment limited and enumerated powers and left to the states the
remaining sovereign authority of the United States.77 This "residual
sovereignty," as described by ChiefJustice John Marshall, includes that
"immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the
territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government."78
Although the power to zone lies exclusively with the states, they
may delegate the power to regulate land use to local governments,
is not a formula take-out food restaurant. Only one formula take-out food
restaurant is permitted per parcel, lot or tract on which all or a portion of
the building is located. No drive through facilities are allowed.
BAINBRIDGE ISLAND, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.41.050(B) (1) (2008), available at
http://www.mrsc.org/mc/bainbridge/bainisl8/bainisl841.html#18.41.050.
71 L.A., Cal., Ordinance 180103 (July 29, 2008).
72 JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAs E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAw § 3.5 (2d ed. 2007).
73 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905);JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra
note 72, § 3.5.
74 STEVENJ. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 2-3 (3d ed. 2005).
75 THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 164 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
76 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 28.
77 D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv.
471, 475 (2004).
78 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
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including municipal corporations such as cities, villages, towns, and
counties. 79 Traditionally, almost all of the police power was delegated
to local governments. 80 In recent decades, however, certain state leg-
islatures have begun to remove some of this power from local govern-
ments and institute state control instead.8' Most states delegate the
power to control land use to local municipalities through zoning-ena-
bling acts.82 Local zoning is then valid unless the procedures estab-
lished in the enabling act are not adequately followed.83
Zoning regulations were first declared constitutional in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,84 which affirmed comprehensive zoning as a
permissible exercise of the police power and the protection of public
health as a permissible goal of zoning laws.85 Euclid involved a zoning
ordinance that divided a municipality into a number of zones ranging
from most restrictive, where relatively few land uses were allowed, to
least restrictive, where all land uses were allowed. 6 The property
owner had purchased a tract of land for industrial purposes prior to
the zoning scheme, which zoned the tract for residential uses, signifi-
cantly decreasing its market value.87 Ambler Realty sought to enjoin
the enforcement of the zoning ordinance, arguing that it violated Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment88 by depriving the company of
79 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 72, § 3.5.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. Almost every state has adopted enabling acts substantially patterned after
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, released in 1924, which was the result of the
work of an Advisory Committee appointed by then-Secretary of Commerce, Herbert
Hoover. Id. § 3.6. Most states still use this format while adopting piecemeal modifica-
tions over the years. Id. The first three sections of the Standard Act state the pur-
poses of the zoning regulation and establish its scope. Id. The subsequent sections
provide provisions for adopting the legislation and making amendments. Id. There
are additional provisions calling for the establishment of a zoning commission or
planning commission. Id. The Standard Act also allows for the establishment of a
Board of Adjustment to hear appeals from enforcement of the zoning ordinance,
establish acceptable exceptions, and give variances. Id. Finally, the Standard Act con-
tains provisions for enforcement of the zoning regulations. Id.
83 Id. However, zoning that does not follow the procedures established under
the enabling act can be held valid under other authority, such as the power to estab-
lish building codes. Id.
84 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
85 Id. at 379-81. As a result, this type of cumulative zoning has come to be called
"Euclidean" zoning. See Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and
Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1704 (1998).
86 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380.
87 Id. at 384.
88 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("[N] or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .").
[VOL. 85-1402
THE ZONING DIET
its property without the due process of law and that it denied Ambler
Realty equal protection of the law.89 The Supreme Court disagreed
and granted the municipality a fair amount of deference, concluding,
"[T] he reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it
must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional,
that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare."90
Euclid conclusively established that zoning for public health is a
legitimate exercise of a state's police power. Since Euclid, courts have
continued to give great deference to municipalities in reviewing zon-
ing laws established to protect the public health.9'
III. THE DoRmANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The dormant Commerce Clause is an implied legal doctrine that
evolved from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause limits the states' ability to
regulate economic activities on which Congress has been silent. In
practice, the dormant Commerce Clause prevents the states from pass-
ing legislation that unduly burdens or discriminates against interstate
commerce. Courts apply a two-part analysis to dormant Commerce
Clause challenges, first looking at whether the challenged law is dis-
criminatory on its face (and, as a result, per se invalid), and, in the
alternative, at whether a facially neutral law has a disproportionate
effect on interstate commerce. The difficulty in dormant Commerce
Clause analysis is determining where to draw the line between discrim-
ination and incidental effect-a decision which will often determine
the fate of a piece of economic legislation.
A. The Evolution of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall have Power . . [t] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."92 If Con-
gress acts within its delegated power to regulate commerce, a congres-
sional act will preempt any state statute that conflicts with it. 3
89 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
90 Id. at 395 (citing Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chi., 242 U.S. 526, 530-31
(1917) andJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905)).
91 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 32.
92 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
93 1 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT 554 (2d ed.
2006). In order to be a valid exercise of its delegated power, an act of Congress must
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Accordingly, courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause to include
a dormant aspect, involving the negative effect of the Commerce
Clause when Congress has not spoken on a subject.9 4 This dormant
Commerce Clause limits the states' ability to regulate commercial
activities on which Congress has not actively legislated, thus reserving
a zone of commercial regulation for Congress.9 5 However, the dor-
mant Commerce Clause's preemptive effect is only conditional
because Congress can authorize a state to regulate a certain economic
activity that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause.9 6
There are several justifications for the dormant Commerce
Clause. At the time the Founders drafted the Constitution, the states
were erecting major trade barriers against one another. 7 The Consti-
tution served as a tool for promoting economic efficiency by moving
the country towards a common market system.9 8 The dormant Com-
merce Clause protects people and commerce from the economically
protectionist actions of states by prohibiting a state from passing legis-
lation that would burden or discriminate against interstate com-
merce.99 The clause also protects out-of-staters, who would otherwise
have relatively little protection from the regulating state's political
process.100
Determining where the police power of the states ends and where
the dormant Commerce Clause begins is often a difficult task. Today,
a two-part analysis is applied to determine the validity of state regula-
tions affecting interstate commerce. The first step in analyzing state
economic legislation is to determine whether the law discriminates on
its face against interstate commerce. 01 The Supreme Court has
not exceed any constitutional limitation on congressional power, not just those estab-
lished by the Commerce Clause. See id.
94 See id.
95 See id.; see also Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their
Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy
Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 259, 265 (2008) ("It has
long been recognized that while the clause is explicitly a positive grant of authority to
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, it also has an implicit 'negative' or 'dor-
mant' aspect in limiting the authority of States to regulate in the same way.").
96 CURTIS ET AL., supra note 93, at 555. Other limitations on the states' powers,
such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, are not
limits that Congress can authorize the states to violate.
97 Id. at 554.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 555.
100 Id.




defined discrimination as "differential treatment of in-state and out-
of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter."102 State laws motivated solely by economic protectionism are
subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."1 0 3 Courts subject such
statutes to strict scrutiny and render them invalid unless the State can
demonstrate a compelling interest for its regulation.104 The regula-
tory means employed must be the least restrictive available with
respect to their burden on interstate commerce.105
The second part of the analysis is invoked "[w]here the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental." 0 6 Here,
the courts use a balancing test to determine whether the interstate
burden imposed by the law outweighs the local benefits. 07 If this is
found to be the case, the law is generally held unconstitutional.1 0 8
This far more deferential analysis is known as the "Pike balancing
test."lO9
B. The Line Between Discrimination and Incidental Effect
Both the Supreme Court and scholars have noted the difficulty in
identifying exactly where discrimination ends and "incidental effect"
begins."10 An example of this problem is illustrated by a pair of cases
with similar facts but dissimilar outcomes: Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising CommissionI' and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
102 Ore. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
103 City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
104 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
105 Id.
106 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
107 See id. ("If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."). The Court gave only a vague expla-
nation of the application of the test, indicating that it was a question of degree once a
legitimate local purpose is found. Ryan Tichenor, Note, The Public Entity End Run:
Government Actor's Exception to Dormant Commerce Clause Considerations, 15 Mo. ENVrTL. L.
& PoL'Y REv. 435, 440 (2008).
108 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
109 See generally id. (establishing the balancing test).
110 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986) ("We have also recognized that there is no clear line separating the category of
state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the
category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach."); Baker & Konar-
Steenberg, supra note 34, at 6.
111 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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Co. 112 Hunt involved a 1973 North Carolina statute that required all
apples sold, offered for sale, or shipped to the state to bear a USDA
grade and that did not accept any state grading systems.1 3 The Wash-
ington State Apple Advertising Commission brought suit claiming that
the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate com-
merce. 114 The Court found that the facially neutral North Carolina
statute had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. 15 The
discrimination in Hunt took several forms.116 The statute raised the
cost of business for Washington apple growers in the North Carolina
market, while leaving the costs of their North Carolina counterparts
unaffected." 7 The statute also eliminated the competitive advantage
that Washington's apple industry had earned by creating its own indi-
vidual, extensive grading system.118 Finally, the statute served as a
competitive leveler by prohibiting the Washington growers from mar-
keting their apples under their state's grade, operating to the advan-
tage of local North Carolina apple growers.119
Clover Leaf concerned a 1977 Minnesota statute banning the retail
sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, while
allowing the sale of milk in other nonreturnable and nonrefillable
containers, such as cardboard milk cartons. 120 The Court found that
the statute was not facially discriminatory because it "'regulate [d]
evenhandedly' by prohibiting all milk retailers from selling their prod-
ucts in plastic, nonreturnable milk containers, without regard to
whether the milk, the containers, or the sellers [were] from outside
the State."121 The Court applied the Pike balancing test and found
that the burden imposed on interstate commerce was "relatively
minor" as milk products could continue moving freely across the Min-
nesota border because most dairies packaged their products in more
than one type of container. 122 While the Court acknowledged that
the Minnesota pulpwood producers were "likely to benefit signifi-
112 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
113 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 335.
114 Id. At the time of the case, Washington State was the largest producer of
apples in the country and used an industry-accepted grading system that was
equivalent or superior to the USDA's grades and standards. Id. at 336.
115 Id. at 352-53.
116 Id. at 350.
117 Id. at 351.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458 (1981).
121 Id. at 471-72 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
122 Id. at 472.
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cantly from the Act at the expense of out-of-state firms,"1 23 the Court
nonetheless found that
[a] nondiscriminatory regulation serving substantial state purposes
is not invalid simply because it causes some business to shift from a
predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominately in-state
industry. Only if the burden on interstate commerce clearly out-
weighs the State's legitimate purposes does such a regulation violate
the Commerce Clause. 124
The most common explanation for the disparate outcomes of
these cases is that the North Carolina statute in Hunt appeared to
have a somewhat discriminatory purpose, while the Court accepted
the Minnesota statute in Clover Leaf as an innocent environmental
measure. 2 5 The Court still, however, appears to inconsistently apply
the doctrine. In Hunt, the Court noted that while there was evidence
of protectionist intent in the record, there was no need to attach an
economic protectionist motive to the North Carolina statute to resolve
the case.' 2 6 However, four years later in Clover Leaf the Court charac-
terized Hunt as being decided precisely on that ground-intentional
discrimination.127 While the legal world is still left questioning this
distinction, these cases appear to "suggest that the difference between
discriminatory effect and incidental burdens is whether there is evi-
dence of discriminatory purpose."128
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed how the dormant
Commerce Clause applies to zoning.'2 9 Municipal zoning laws do not
generally discriminate between in-locality and out-of-locality
residents. 30 Therefore, courts will have to weigh the interests of the
locality against the burden the ordinance places on interstate com-
merce. 3 1 As the history of the dormant Commerce Clause illustrates,
"facially neutral but burdensome local regulations . . . tend to avoid
123 Id. at 473.
124 Id. at 474.
125 Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 34, at 7.
126 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977) ("[W]e
need not ascribe an economic protection motive to the North Carolina Legislature to
resolve this case . . .).
127 Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 34, at 7 (citing Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at
471 n.15).
128 Id. This idea does not in any way create a bright-line rule and more recent
case law has done nothing to further illuminate the distinction. Id.
129 Id. at 3.
130 Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitu-
tion, 94 VA. L. REv. 1091, 1122 (2008).
131 Id.
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judicial scrutiny."13 2 This is the case despite the fact that many land
use regulations, like anti-big box store or fast food outlet ordinances,
have a somewhat protectionist purpose and effect.133 Many of these
land use regulations will pass judicial muster because they are often
passed for aesthetic or safety purposes. However, these local anticom-
petitive regulations are beginning to attract the attention of scholars
and litigators. 134
IV. USING RESTRICTIVE ZONING TO SHRINK AMERICAN WAISTLINES
The positive correlation between fast food and obesity leads to
the conclusion that by reducing the availability of fast food and dis-
placing these restaurants with healthier food and lifestyle options,
local governments can encourage a healthier lifestyle for their com-
munities.135 Local governments are using restrictive zoning as a legal
intervention to control overweight and obesity in their communi-
ties.136 Restrictive zoning for the express purpose of the public's
health, safety, morals, and welfare is a valid exercise of the police
power delegated to local governments by the states.13 7 Fast food zon-
ing will survive constitutional challenges under the dormant Com-
merce Clause because it is neither facially discriminatory towards
interstate commerce nor unduly burdensome to this type of
commerce.
A. A Valid Exercise of the Police Power
The power to legislate solely in the interest of the public's health,
safety, morals, and general welfare is reserved for the states, who have
delegated some of their authority to local governments.138 "[A]ll fifty
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 One such land use regulation is the San Francisco anti-chain restaurant ordi-
nance, which explicitly seeks to protect its residents' opportunities for employment
and local business ownership. S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(a) (2) (2008), avail-
able at http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14139&sid=5 ("San
Francisco needs to protect its vibrant small business sector and create a supportive
environment for new small business innovations. One of the eight Priority Policies of
the City's General Plan resolves that 'existing neighborhood-serving retail uses be pre-
served and enhanced and future opportunities for resident employment in and own-
ership of such businesses enhanced.'").
135 See MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 20 ("Zoning provides a useful tool for reducing
access to fast food restaurants and for encouraging healthier alternatives.").
136 Gostin, supra note 27, at 88.
137 See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 91-95 (2d ed. 2008).
138 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; GosTIN, supra note 137, at 91-95.
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states have delegated at least some of their zoning authority to local
governments . . . ."139 Therefore, local governments make most zon-
ing decisions.14 0 The United States Supreme Court describes the
police power as "one of the most essential of powers, at times the most
insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of
government."141
An examination of the history of zoning suggests that public
health provides the strongest legal basis for zoning.142 Zoning in the
United States originated in New York City in 1916, when New York
became the first city to adopt a comprehensive zoning ordinance, for
the express purpose of protecting the quality of light and air.14 3
States and cities began to establish land use restrictions to prevent the
spread of disease as cities began to grow rapidly in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.i" Some cities restricted the expansion of
urban cemeteries while others placed height limits on buildings to
ensure proper access to light and air for the health of the
community.145
While much of the focus on public health in terms of land use
was lost to concerns over property value, today, many local govern-
ments have begun to refocus their efforts on legislating towards com-
munity wellness.146 States and local governments realize that they are
"in a unique position to physically reshape communities in ways that
are good for public coffers, private balance sheets, and the personal
health of the states' respective citizens."14 7 Many cities and states are
currently legislating to protect health and wellness by supporting com-
munity design initiatives such as smoking bans, water fluoridation
mandates, and infrastructure improvements, thereby encouraging
people to live healthier lifestyles.148 Similar efforts have been specifi-
139 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 28-29.
140 See id. at 29.
141 District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909).
142 See MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 32, 36.
143 See Bruce Bragg et al., Land Use and Zoning for the Public's Health, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHics 78, 78 (2003); see also MAIR ET AL., supa note 8, at 33-34 (discussing the 1913
report recommending height, bulk, and use restrictions to protect the public health,
which led to the 1916 ordinance).
144 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 33.
145 Id.
146 See Cynthia A. Baker, Bottom Lines and Waist Lines: State Governments Weigh in on
Wellness, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 185, 193 (2008); Bragg et al., supra note 143, at 79.
147 Baker, supra note 146, at 194 (suggesting that "community design efforts might
be the most politically and legally viable tool to legislate toward wellness").
148 See id. at 194-95.
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cally focused on the public's nutritional health, including trans-fats
bans and the New York City calorie-posting requirement. 149
Both historical and modern applications of restrictive zoning lead
to the conclusion that a local government may restrictively zone fast
food restaurants to combat obesity and overweight. While many
municipalities currently restrict or ban fast food restaurants through
restrictive zoning by legislating under the guise of protecting commu-
nity aesthetics, 15 0 local governments have not generally employed
land use planning or regulations as a mechanism to directly impact
food consumption and nutrition.151 This type of legislation is likely to
be met with some resistance due, in part, to the universal acceptance
of fast food.
While American culture is inculcated with fast food, many other
forms of previously accepted cultural norms have been restrictively
zoned and survived bitter criticism as somewhat revolutionary land use
restrictions. The first famous example is the 1995 New York City reso-
lution that restrictively zoned nonobscene adult entertainment
throughout the city's five boroughs.15 2 The resolution was enacted
based on a 1993 study conducted by the New York City Division of City
Planning linking adult businesses to neighborhood deterioration,
including increased crime, decreased property values, and reduced
shopping and commercial activities.153 The City sought to remedy the
secondary effects of adult businesses in the community. The commu-
nity strongly resisted the resolution, in part because the adult
entertainment industry was burgeoning in New York City at that
time.154 The New York City resolution passed constitutional muster by
149 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
151 Perdue et al., supra note 27, at 560.
152 Rachel Simon, Note, New York City's Restrictive Zoning of Adult Businesses: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 23 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 187 (1995).
153 Memorandum from the N.Y. State Office of Gen. Counsel on Municipal Regu-
lation of Adult Uses, http://www.dos.state.ny.us/cnsl/lu03.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2009) [hereinafter Memorandum].
154 See Simon, supra note 152, at 189-90 ("In 1965, there were only nine adult
entertainment establishments in New York City because of heavy restrictions on the
sale of pornography. By 1976, after the City lifted the restrictions, the number of
adult businesses flared to 151. By 1993 the number of adult establishments reached
an estimated 177.... The DCP estimate[d] that at [that] rate of increase, by the year
2002, the number of bookstores, peep shows, and stores selling adult videos [would
have] increase[d] by 197 percent, to approximately 250 . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
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only restricting adult uses within the community rather than prohibiting
them entirely. 55
Another example of a heavily resisted land use restriction is the
restrictive zoning of "big box" retail stores, which emerged as part of
the battle against sprawl accompanying suburbanization in the United
States.15 6 These types of retailers, including Costco, Target, Home
Depot, and Wal-Mart, have been termed "category killers" due to their
predisposition to completely dominate a segment of the market and
force out smaller retail stores who cannot compete with the price
points of the behemoths.15 7 While big box retail outlets drive out
competition with their low prices, they still know where to set prices so
as to maximize their profits.15 8 In 2006, Wal-Mart earned more than
$312 billion dollars in net sales, a nine percent increase over 2005.15
While some individuals claim to be ethically opposed to these category
killers, people are often driven through their doors by the burden
that shopping elsewhere places on their wallets.16 0 As a result of the
rapid expansion of the big box retailers, many municipalities suffer
from greyfield epidemics.'61 Big box stores abandon their large
storefronts for even larger spaces with more shelf space to increase
their selection of products, leaving obsolete concrete warehouses that
serve as an eyesore for the community.162 These greyfields have an
even bigger impact on the health, safety, and general welfare of small
communities, which have slower, less congested lifestyles and a
stronger sense of community.' 6 3
155 Memorandum, supra note 153. "[T]he Court of Appeals held that New York
City's effort to address the negative secondary effects of adult establishments is not
constitutionally objectionable under any of the applicable federal or state constitu-
tional standards." Id. (citing City of N.Y. v. Stringfellow's of N.Y., Ltd., 749 N.E.2d 192
(N.Y. 2001)).
156 Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances and
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. LAw. 907, 907 (2005).
157 See Dwight H. Merriam, Breaking Big Boxes: Learning from the Horse Whisperers, 6
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 7, 7-8, 10 (2005).
158 Id. at 10.
159 Betsy H. Sochar, Comment, Shining the Light on Greyfields: A Wal-Mart Case Study
on Preventing Abandonment of Big Box Stores Through Land Use Regulations, 71 ALB. L.
REv. 697, 701 (2008).
160 Merriam, supra note 157, at 8 ("It is the hundreds of millions of bargain-hun-
gry shoppers who feed these formats and cause them to grow to sumo-like propor-
tions. . . . 'Wal-Mart has not become the world's largest retailer by putting a gun to
our heads and forcing us to shop there.'" (quoting Robert B. Reich, Don't Blame Wal-
Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A19)).
161 Sochar, supra note 159, at 702-03.
162 See id.
163 Id. at 703.
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In order to combat the negative impact of big box retailers, many
municipalities have successfully utilized restrictive zoning regulations
to limit their growth and prevent greyfields.16 4 Several types of zoning
ordinances have been used to restrict or exclude big box retailers,
including aesthetic specifications in zoning ordinances and size-cap
zoning ordinances.16 5 While local governments restrictively zone big
box retailers under the pretext of aesthetic concerns, many have
expressed, within the text of the ordinance or in statements from sup-
porters of the ordinance, economic protectionism as a goal. 16 6 These
types of zoning ordinances have survived constitutional challenges
brought by the big box retailers because they are tied to the general
health, safety, and welfare of the public.167
Local governments have already been successful in restrictively
zoning fast food restaurants for the protection of public health, such
as pedestrian safety, congestion, and air and environmental quality.' 68
While no reported court decisions discuss land use restrictions uti-
lized specifically for the purpose of reducing overweight and obesity,
several cases have upheld zoning restrictions on fast food restaurants
for other public health goals such as traffic concerns,16 9 public health
necessity, 70 and community need.171 The courts' willingness to
uphold these types of zoning laws, coupled with the undisputed pres-
164 Id. at 706.
165 Id. at 710-13.
166 See Denning & Lary, supra note 156, at 913; see, e.g., TOWN OF WARWICK, N.Y.,
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN § 3.4 (2008) (listing protectionist purposes for the 60,0000
square foot limit on retail businesses including to "[s]upport small locally owned busi-
nesses and retail centers which are in character with the Town's largely rural environ-
ment" and to "[c] reate a commercial atmosphere friendly to small business and home
occupations"); RIVER FAuS, Wis., TowN CODE § 17.075(1) (2003), available at http://
www.riverfallstown.com/codeindex.html (describing the purpose of an ordinance
requiring retail stores exceeding 150,000 square feet in gross floor area to apply for a
special use permit as "ensur[ing] that large-scale retail developments are compatible
with surrounding land uses and contribute to the unique community character of
River Falls . . . and it's [sic] citizens are protected").
167 Sochar, supra note 159, at 730.
168 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 54. In Bellas v. Planning Board, No. 00-P-1837,
2002 WL 31455225, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 4, 2002), the Appeals Court of Massa-
chusetts upheld the planning board's denial of a special permit for a drive-through
window at a Dunkin Donuts because of evidence that the added traffic resulting from
the addition of a drive-through window, combined with the number of school chil-
dren passing through the area during peak hours, would threaten pedestrian safety.
Id. at *2.
169 See Bellas, 2002 WL 31455225, at *2.
170 See SBA, Inc. v. City of Asheville City Council, 539 S.E.2d 18, 21 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000) (finding that the requirement that a proposed use of property is "reasonably
necessary for the public health or general welfare" is valid, suggesting that such a
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ence of an American obesity epidemic and its negative effects on the
country's health and economy, lead to the conclusion that courts are
likely to uphold zoning laws aimed at combating obesity.
Restrictive zoning of fast food restaurants is a valid exercise of a
local government's police power because it is rationally related to the
public's health, which is, as discussed above, the strongest basis for
zoning laws. 172 The use of the police power to protect the public wel-
fare is "broad and inclusive."173 The Supreme Court gives great defer-
ence to legislative bodies in establishing reasonable plans to protect
the public.174 In Berman v. Parker,175 the Court found that "[t]he val-
ues [public welfare] represents are spiritual as well as physical, aes-
thetic as well as monetary."176 "It is within the power of the legislature
to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled."177 Therefore, because of the overwhelming evidence
regarding the severity of the American obesity epidemic,178 and the
Court's discretionary approach to police power cases, ordinances
enacted to combat obesity will be upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power.
This conclusion finds further support in the historical use of
restrictive zoning to restrict or eliminate adult entertainment estab-
lishments and big box retailers. Like the New York City resolution
requirement is a legitimate exercise of municipal zoning power in North Carolina
and possibly other states).
171 See Scadron v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 637 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(interpreting a zoning requirement that a use be "necessary for the public conve-
nience" to require the applicant to "demonstrate that the community will derive at
least some benefit from the proposed use" and affirming the City of Chicago's denial
of a use permit for failure to show that the use was "necessary for public convenience
or in any manner expedient to public welfare").
172 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
173 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32, 33 (1954) ("Public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more conspicuous
examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet
they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it."); see also
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (describing the police power as
"one of the most essential powers of government, one that is the least limitable").
174 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33; see also Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 395 (1926) (establishing a deferential approach to judicial review of land use
regulations).
175 348 U.S. at 26.
176 Id. at 33.
177 Id.
178 See supra Part I.A.
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that restrictively zoned adult entertainment establishments, 7 9 restric-
tive zoning of fast food restaurants seeks to combat the secondary
effects of the restaurants' overwhelming presence, including over-
weight and obesity. In addition, restrictive ordinances, such as the
Los Angeles ICO, only restrict the expansion of fast food restaurants
within the community rather than eliminate them altogether, a dis-
tinction that allowed the New York resolution to survive constitutional
challenge.180 As illustrated by the restriction of big box retailers in
many communities, local governments have successfully employed
land use planning techniques for the implicit purpose of economic
protectionism of their communities. Therefore, in the case of fast
food, it can be argued that municipalities may zone to achieve, in part,
healthful protectionism since the public health is the strongest basis
for zoning laws. Furthermore, like restrictive zoning of big box retail-
ers, zoning restrictions on fast food establishments will survive consti-
tutional challenge because they too are tied to the health and welfare
of the community.
It is important to note that, while restrictive zoning of fast food
restaurants for the express purpose of combating obesity is a valid
exercise of the police power, local governments are best advised to
assert multiple justifications for their ordinances to avoid constitu-
tional criticism and scrutiny. Many municipalities currently restrict or
ban fast food restaurants through restrictive zoning legislated under
the guise of protecting community aesthetics.18 1 While local govern-
ments can restrictively zone these establishments for the sole purpose
of combating overweight and obesity, including this purpose with a
variety of previously accepted goals serves to prevent a certain level of
resistance to the legislation. Skillfully drafted ordinances enable
municipalities to receive the same judicial deference that their prede-
cessors traditionally have. An example of a mixed-purpose ordinance
is the Los Angeles ICO, which includes among its purposes, commer-
cial market expansion, aesthetic protectionism, and the health and
welfare of the community.' 82 Such an ordinance will be upheld under
the police power as protecting public health, safety, and welfare.
179 See Simon, supra note 152, at 187.
180 Memorandum, supra note 153. Had the New York resolution banned adult
businesses, it would have been challenged, and most likely struck down, as a violation
of the freedom of expression. See id. Furthermore, such a ban would have difficulty
passing constitutional scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.
181 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
182 See supra text accompanying note 13.
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B. Fast Food and the Dormant Commerce Clause
A municipality's power to restrictively zone is limited to the
extent that it violates the Constitution or is not rationally related to
the protection of the public's health, safety, morals, or welfare.1 8 3
While an ordinance that restrictively zones fast food restaurants is
rationally related to the protection of the public's health and welfare,
courts have yet to address whether it passes constitutional muster
under the dormant Commerce Clause. Fast food zoning will survive
constitutional challenge because it is not discriminatory on its face,
and its incidental effects are not unduly burdensome on interstate
commerce.
The first step in analyzing economic legislation is to determine
whether it is discriminatory on its face and, as a result, per se inva-
lid.18 4 Because municipal zoning laws do not generally discriminate
between in-locality and out-of-locality residents, these regulations usu-
ally satisfy the first step of dormant Commerce Clause analysis. How-
ever, even if this were not the case, an ordinance restrictively zoning
fast food for health purposes, such as the Los Angeles ICO, is not
facially discriminatory. The Los Angeles ICO does not treat in-state
and out-of-state interests differently, or provide a benefit to the for-
mer at a cost to the latter.18 5 While some might argue that a fast food
183 MAIR ET AL., supra note 8, at 38.
184 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 338 (2007).
185 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005) (striking down New York state
statutes, which imposed additional burdens on out-of-state wineries seeking to sell and
ship wine directly to New York customers, in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
594-95 (1997) (invalidating a Maine property tax exemption, which benefited institu-
tions that mostly served state residents and penalized institutions that did principally
interstate business, as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause); Ore. Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1994) (invalidating an Oregon state
surcharge, which imposed a higher cost for in-state disposal of out-of-state waste than
on in-state disposal of in-state waste, as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause);
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981) (finding a Min-
nesota statute regulating the type of containers in which milk could be sold in the
state not facially discriminatory because it "'regulate [d] evenhandedly' by prohibiting
all milk retailers from selling their products in plastic, nonreturnable milk containers,
without regard to whether the milk, the containers, or the sellers [were] from outside
the State" (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970))); City of
Phila. v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (finding that a NewJersey statute that
prohibited the importation of most solid or liquid waste from outside of the state
violated the dormant Commerce Clause); see also Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928) ("A State is without power to prevent privately owned
articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground
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zoning ordinance is a protectionist measure, preventing national
chains from entering the market and protecting local businesses, this
is not an issue with ordinances that broadly define fast food. Such an
ordinance restricts all types of fast food restaurants ranging from
national chains to local taquerias and hot dog stands. 186 This type of
broadly defined fast food zoning ordinance is therefore not facially
discriminatory.
A fast food zoning ordinance also survives the second part of dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis, the Pike balancing test.18 7 This part
of the analysis is used to determine whether the burden placed on
interstate commerce by the legislation is outweighed by its purported
benefits.188 A fast food ordinance prevents certain restaurants, includ-
ing national chains, from entering the local market. However, as pre-
viously discussed, this is not a protectionist measure because the
ordinance also places restrictions on local businesses trying to sell fast
food to the local market. It is also important to note that both out-of-
state and local food service establishments are not completely banned
from the area and may freely operate a non-fast-food restaurant within
the community.
The benefit fast food ordinances provide to a municipality far
outweighs any incidental burden that restricting additional fast food
restaurants from entering the community places on interstate com-
merce. Such ordinances not only prevent additional unhealthy diet-
ary options from entering the market, but also reserve scarce land and
retail property for healthier lifestyle options, such as grocery stores,
recreational parks, and restaurants with more nutritional options.
Even if the legislation has an incidental effect of shifting some busi-
ness to in-state industry, the Supreme Court held in Clover Leaf that
such a shift does not invalidate the legislation as long as it is serving a
"substantial state purpose[ ]."189 As in Clover Leaf fast food zoning
only has an incidental burden on interstate commerce, rather than a
that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the
people of the State.").
186 See, e.g., L.A., Cal., Ordinance 180103 (July 29, 2008) (defining fast food res-
taurant broadly as "[a]ny establishment which dispenses food for consumption on or
off the premises, and which has the following characteristics: a limited menu, items
prepared in advance or prepared or heated quickly, no table orders, and food served
in disposable wrapping or containers").
187 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
188 Id.
189 Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 474.
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discriminatory effect, which is acceptable when coupled with a sub-
stantial benefit.'90
The American obesity epidemic is something that affects every
American, whether in their own individual health or in healthcare
costs, as the burden on the health care system continues to grow as a
result of the negative medical effects of overweight and obesity. 9 1
Such a substantial and pervasive interest as the health of the country,
or in this case the municipality, far outweighs any incidental burden
on interstate commerce. It is the core purpose of the government to
protect and promote human well-being, and the ability to live a
healthy and fulfilling life cannot be undervalued.192 Therefore, fast
food zoning survives the second part of the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis and is a constitutional application of the power of local
governments to regulate to protect the health, safety, morals, and
public welfare of the community.
CONCLUSION
With the majority of Americans believing that obesity is an epi-
demic in our country, all of us, including local governments, must
play our parts in combating this problem. The prevalence of fast food
in our culture and our neighborhoods is a major contributing factor
to overweight and obesity in America. As the increasing rate of obes-
ity in adults and children makes clear, individuals cannot successfully
fight the battle against obesity alone. Left to our own devices, we con-
tinue to feed the epidemic and drain American resources through a
variety of direct and indirect costs. Local governments have begun to
intervene through land use planning to protect public health, safety,
morals, and welfare, by restrictively zoning fast food outlets. Until
recently, local governments have effectively zoned fast food for aes-
thetic or safety reasons, but never for the express purpose of combat-
ing obesity or directly impacting food consumption and nutrition.
However, with the approval of the Los Angeles Interim Control Ordi-
nance, the debate over the validity of zoning to combat obesity and
promote a healthy lifestyle has been ignited.
Restrictive zoning to reduce obesity is a valid exercise of a munici-
pality's police power. Public health is the strongest basis for zoning
laws and has traditionally been upheld as a valid purpose by courts in
190 See supra Part III.B.
191 See supra Part I.A.
192 Perdue et al., supra note 27, at 560 ("Health is vital to obtaining a livelihood,
engaging in recreation and social interaction, as well as in participating in the politi-
cal process.").
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a variety of contexts. The states have a substantial interest in protect-
ing the health and well-being of their citizens and reducing or elimi-
nating the health concerns attributed to overweight and obesity.
These ordinances are rationally related to the protection of public
health and welfare and will survive constitutional challenge under the
dormant Commerce Clause. They are not discriminatory on their
face and will pass the Pike balancing test because their benefits-
reducing obesity and its health risks-far outweigh any incidental
interstate burdens that result.
While ordinances that encompass a mixed purpose, such as the
Los Angeles ICO, will most likely face less constitutional criticism and
scrutiny, this type of careful drafting is unnecessary to create constitu-
tionally valid ordinances. Restrictive zoning of fast food outlets is one
of many potentially successful tools that can be used to advance the
battle against the American obesity epidemic. While critics may argue
that the government has no right to interfere with our personal
choices, they must acknowledge that the protection and promotion of
human well-being is a core purpose of the government. Without our
health, we as a people are unable to pursue the opportunities that our
predecessors worked so hard to provide for us.
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